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MEMORANDUM TO THE MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION 
The principal authors of this memorandum are Professor J W McGilvray and 
Professor D R F Simpson. 
In preparing this paper, we have had the benefit of discussions not only 
with representatives of the principal parties, but also with a wide range of 
individuals and organisations whose experience of banking and finance in 
Scotland, London and overseas we gratefully acknowledge. 
INTRODUCTION 
We recognise that the principal term of reference before the Commission is 
to ascertain whether the proposed takeovers of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group by the Standard Chartered Bank and by the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation would operate against the public interest. Acceptance 
of the Standard Chartered bid was recommended to Royal Bank shareholders by 
their Board of Directors. We shall show that acceptance of this bid was in 
the interest of the Directors but not of the shareholders, and that both 
proposed takeovers operate against the public interest. 
Accordingly, our submission is presented as follows: 
Section 1 - The Background to the Takeover Bids 
Section 2 - The Takeover Bids 
Section 3 - The Directors' Interest 
Section 4 - The Shareholders' Interest 
Section 5 - The Public Interest in the United Kingdom 
Section 6 - The Public Interest in Scotland 
Section 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations. 
SECTION 1 - THE BACKGROUND TO THE TAKEOVERS 
1.1 The Directors of the Royal Bank have made it plain that, in their 
view, a takeover bid for the Bank was inevitable, and that one such 
bid was desirable. In this section, we shall argue that the 
situation in which the Bank became vulnerable to a takeover bid arose 
as a result of a period of lack of development, for which the 
Directors must accept responsibility. 
Lack of Development of the Royal Bank 
1.2 The decade from 1971 was one of unprecedented change in British 
banking. New techniques of lending were adopted and expanded, while 
competition for deposits became more intense. The British 
commercial banks began to move more and more into longer term 
lending. As a consequence, opportunities arose which some Banks 
were quick to seize. 
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1.3 Without any shortage of capital for expansion, the Royal Bank failed 
to take advantage of these opportunities. Although it had been the 
first British Bank to acquire a finance house (in 1959) the decade of 
the seventies was unmarked by any comparable initiative. Amongst 
the more obvious missed opportunities was the failure to assimilate 
Williams and Glyn's with the Royal Bank, and the failure to open new 
branches of the former bank in England. Nor was the opportunity to 
acquire a merchant bank realised, while expansion overseas was half-
hearted. The acquisition of a commercial bank in the United States 
or a merchant bank in Germany, for example, were among unrealised 
possibilities. As a consequence, the decade concluded with a poor 
earnings performance for the Bank, during a period when other 
comparable banks were doing better. 
Size of the Royal Bank 
1.4 It has been suggested by the Directors that a takeover bid is 
desirable because the Bank is insufficiently large to give it 
'financial muscle'. This suggestion is contradicted by the evidence 
given to the Wilson Committee by the chief executives of the three 
Scottish Banks, of whom one was Mr John Burke, Managing Director of 
the Royal Bank. It is contradicted again by the evidence of the 
size distribution of commercial banks in other industrialised 
countries and also by the experience of a smaller Scottish bank, the 
Bank of Scotland. 
1.5 In the course of their oral evidence to the Wilson Committee, the 
chief executives of the Scottish banks were repeatedly questioned by 
a member of the Committee about the capital base of the Scottish 
banks as a limiting factor in their activities. They denied 
explicitly that the size of their capital base limited their 
"financial muscle". 
1.6 The Royal Bank ranks 125 in the world in terms of the size of its net 
assets. The Bank of Scotland ranks 192 by the same standard. 
Since there are more than 14,500 banks in the United States and more 
than 4,000 in West Germany, it is clear that by world standards, the 
Royal Bank is a large bank. Some comparisons of the size and 
performance of banks are given in sections 5.4 and 5.5 below. 
1.7 With the development of parallel banking and syndicated lending in 
recent years, it is possible for a bank with a very small capital 
base to participate in the largest international loans. It has 
again been suggested that there are particular benefits accruing to 
the leading participants, and that a bank would be excluded from such 
a leading position by the size of its capital base. However, the 
Bank of Scotland is the leading bank in the consortium which is 
likely to finance the UK North Sea Gas Gathering Pipeline, at a cost 
of £2.7billion, one of the largest ever such ventures. 
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SECTIOM 2 - THE TAKEOVER BIDS 
2.1 From the standpoint of size, there were therefore no grounds for the 
Directors to put the Royal Bank up for sale. Sale, however, may 
have commended itself as an effortless alternative to development, 
which the Board had conspicuously failed to attempt in the preceding 
decade. The manner in which the sale was handled throws further 
light on the judgment of the Directors. 
The Standard Chartered Bid 
2.2 The Chairman of the Royal Bank, Sir Michael Herries, states that the 
Board of Directors had concluded "by the end of 1980" that the 
interests of the Bank would be best served "if we could achieve a 
merger with a United Kingdom bank with a strong overseas presence". 
Less than three months later, on 17 March 1981, the Bank's directors 
announced that they were recommending acceptance of the Standard 
Chartered bid. So far as is known no attempt was made to discover 
whether other bids, and on what terms, might be made. This 
impression of unseemly haste is reinforced by subsequent conflicting 
statements concerning the organisation of the Royal Bank following 
takeover. Specifically, an attempt has been made to create the 
impression that UK banking operations in the enlarged Standard 
Chartered group would be run from Edinburgh, when it was already 
known that the designated chief executive would be London-based. 
2.3 The short span of time which appears to have elapsed between the 
decision to sell the bank and the acceptance of the Standard 
Chartered offer can hardly have been long enough to examine carefully 
the suitability of Standard Chartered as a buyer. Whatever the 
recent failings of the Royal Bank's directors it remains a soundly-
based bank. Given the advantages which Standard Chartered stand to 
gain from a merger a more enterprising board might have made a 
reverse takeover bid for Standard Chartered, thus retaining control. 
This would not of course have obviated the long-run problems of 
association with Standard Chartered, which are discussed below. 
2.4 The directors of the Royal Bank recommended to shareholders on 19 
March acceptance of the first bid from Standard Chartered, a bid 
which valued Royal Bank at some 40% less than its net tangible asset 
value. In other words, if the Royal Bank of Scotland Group Ltd had 
been liquidated, the shareholders would have been better off than if 
they had accepted the directors' advice. 
2.5 The directors of the Royal Bank, as a further means of facilitating 
acceptance of the Standard Chartered bid, had agreed to sell to 
Lloyds Bank the Royal Bank's 39% share in the finance house, Lloyds 
and Scottish Ltd, if the Standard Chartered bid succeeded. However, 
the directors allowed themselves to be outmanoeuvered, and within one 
month of the initial announcement of the bid, Lloyds Bank had gained 
control of more than 50? of the issued share capital of Lloyds and 
Scottish, hitherto one of the most valuable assets of the Royal Bank 
Group. 
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2.6 The inescapable impression is created by these events that, if the 
Royal Bank directors had not proceeded with such haste in accepting 
the Standard Chartered bid, they could have secured terms much more 
favourable to the shareholders, if not to themselves. 
The Hongkong Bid 
2.7 This impression was confirmed by the subsequent bid from the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) for the Royal Bank, which 
valued the latter at some 50$ above the Standard Chartered bid. 
While this offer was later matched in value terms by a second bid 
from Standard Chartered, it is generally accepted that, commercially, 
HSBC is much the more successful bank and, on those grounds should 
have been preferred by the directors, if they had been acting in the 
shareholders' best interests. 
2.8 The Royal Bank directors offer two reasons for their recommendation 
of the Standard Chartered bid. The first is the greater influence 
which they claim they would have through a larger representation on 
the Standard Chartered Board than they were offered by the Hongkong 
bid. Since this influence would not last longer than the careers of 
the persons concerned, and since influence falls short of control, it 
would be of no permanent value to the Bank. Secondly, it is claimed 
that wider career opportunities would be available to Royal Bank 
staff within an enlarged Standard Chartered group than with the 
Hongkong bank. The available evidence suggests that the opposite is 
the case. The indigenisation of staff jobs which is proceeding 
rapidly in the African and Asia branches of the Standard Chartered 
Bank is likely to create an excess supply of British senior staff, 
which would certainly not be to the advantage of existing Royal Bank 
staff. 
2.9 The preference of the Royal Bank directors for the Standard Chartered 
bid over the Hongkong or apparently any other bid must be interpreted 
in the light of the contrast between the offer of eight seats on the 
Standard Chartered board and their fate at the hands of any other 
buyer. In the case of Hongkong, it seems that there may be a 
conflict of personalities between the present Chairman of the Royal 
Bank, a former resident of Hongkong, and the Chairman of the Hongkong 
Bank. 
SECTIOM 3 - THE DIRECTORS' INTEREST 
3.1 In whose interests is acceptance of the Standard Chartered offer? 
3.2 A possible divergence of interest between directors and shareholders 
has for some time been recognised by academic studies of corporate 
behaviour. These studies have shown that whereas directors and 
managers are attracted by the prestige and status which is associated 
with size in the world of business, shareholders retain their 
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traditional interest in maximum profitability. Such a divergence of 
interest is particularly likely to come to a head in situations of 
takeovers or mergers. 
3.3 Under the terms of the Standard Chartered offer, the present 
directors of the Royal Bank are offered eight places, out of twenty-
one, on the expanded Standard Chartered Board. The present Chairman 
of the Royal Bank will become Deputy Chairman of the Standard 
Chartered, and being younger than the Chairman, could reasonably 
expect to succeed him. By comparison, the Hongkong offer would 
provide only three places on the main board for Royal Bank directors; 
for age and other reasons it seems most unlikely that any of them 
could expect to succeed to the Chairmanship of the main Board. 
3.4 It would be wrong to infer that in their recommendation of the 
Standard Chartered bid, the Royal Bank directors have been moved by 
considerations of personal financial gain. It seems more likely 
that in this, as in most other such cases, the interest of the 
directors lies in the enhanced security, prestige, and sense of power 
which comes with membership of the Board of an enlarged company. 
Unfortunately, the psychological rewards of size are seldom matched 
by profitability. 
3.5 Studies of the consequences of takeovers and mergers in the United 
Kingdom in the recent past have shown that they have seldom been 
successful in terms of profitability, and that the expectations of 
their promoters are seldom realised in the long run. This is 
largely because of the difficulties of administration of large 
organisations. In the case of banking, as with other industries, 
there is generally an optimum size for a company. There is 
evidence, reviewed in paragraph 5.4,that the Royal Bank Group, as 
presently constituted, falls within that optimum size range, whereas 
the proposed expanded Standard Chartered Group does not. 
SECTIOH 4 - THE SHAREHOLDERS' INTEREST 
4.1 Size is of course of no benefit to shareholders: it is return on 
capital which matters, and as we have indicated in the foregoing 
paragraphs, increased size may be detrimental to return on capital. 
4.2 In the case of banking, greater size may however lead to greater 
opportunities for profit in some activities. Specifically, 
international trading in major reserve currencies can be highly 
profitable, if carried out successfully. It may be suggested, 
however, that there are at least three conditions necessary for 
success in this sphere of operations. First, the bank concerned 
must have strong and skilful management. Secondly, it must have at 
its disposal large reserves of one or more of the major traded 
currencies. Third, it must be able to record all these transactions 
in one balance sheet; a Group holding company is not enough. 
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4.3 We have already commented previously in Sections 1 and 2 on the 
quality of the management of the Royal Bank. Less can be said about 
the past performance of the Standard Chartered management. However, 
it may be noted that the task of effectively managing a string of 
subsidiary companies, dispersed in sixty countries throughout Africa 
and Asia, where in most cases local interests have a minority or even 
a majority shareholding, must be a continuing source of strain. The 
contrast, in this respect, between Standard Chartered and the larger 
US and UK banks could hardly be more striking. 
4.4 While balance sheets do not reveal the identity of the different 
currencies held as reserves by the various subsidiaries of Standard 
Chartered, consideration of the diversity of countries in which they 
are operating does not suggest that this bank has at its disposal 
large reserves of major currencies. Indeed, many of the currencies 
which it holds are non-transferable. This is revealed in a footnote 
in the second offer document, but the amounts concerned are not 
stated. 
4.5 The banking regulations of most of the countries in which Standard 
Chartered operates are most unlikely to allow movement of reserves 
out of these countries, even when, in principle, the currencies are 
transferable. On the contrary, the tendency towards increasing 
local control is likely to continue, with the Republic of South 
Africa providing a case in point. By 1983 Standard Chartered will 
have to surrender control of its South African subsidiary. 
4.6 Accordingly, while the proposed takeover of the Royal Bank would give 
the Standard Chartered a nominally larger asset-holding which would 
qualify it for the "Big League" in terms of size, it would lack at 
least three of the necessary conditions for profitable performance in 
that league. Indeed, it may not even qualify on grounds of size, 
since, after 1983, the assets and liabilities of the Standard Bank of 
South Africa will no longer be consolidated in the Group accounts. 
4.7 The situation is, however, more serious than this. The Standard 
Bank's deep involvement in several African countries, many of whose 
governments and major commercial concerns are on the brink of 
bankruptcy, means that it is likely to be seriously exposed in one or 
more of these countries. Since reserves are not outwardly 
transferable, there is the risk of default. While the size of this 
risk cannot be known to outsiders, the consequences of default could 
be severe, and one of the few sources of reserves which could be 
called upon in such an event would be those of the Royal Bank. 
4.8 It is evident from the foregoing paragraphs that the commercial 
advantages to the shareholders of the Royal Bank of the proposed 
takeover by Standard Chartered are likely to be negligible whereas 
there are substantial risks. Acceptance of the Standard Chartered 
bid cannot therefore be said to be in the shareholders' interests. 
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SECTION 5 - THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
5.1 The principal effect of the proposed takeovers on the public interest 
in the United Kingdom will be in the way in which it effects 
competition in banking. The public interest in maintaining and 
promoting competition in banking, as in any other industry, is, we 
submit, not derived principally from limiting the market share of any 
participant so as to secure the lowest price for the provision of 
banking services. This argument has merit, but it is a short-run 
argument. The more important reason why the promotion of 
competition is in the public interest is because the greater the 
number of independent decision-making units that there are in any 
industry, the greater is the diversity of thought and decision and 
the greater are the chances of innovation and development. 
5.2 The importance of this point can be illustrated specifically in the 
case of Scottish contributions to the development of the banking and 
finance industry in Britain. Although the Scottish banks together 
have formed no more than 10% of the total British system, their 
separateness has increased the number of independent units within the 
system and has thus permitted the following innovations to be made: 
1. The introduction of banking on the limited liability principle. 
2. The displacement of metallic currency by a note issue. 
3. The development of the branch system of banking. 
4. The invention of the cash credit (forerunner of the 
overdraft). 
5. The development of deposit gathering reinforced by the payment 
of interest. 
6. The adoption of joint-stock banking. 
7. The practice, in times of stress, of banks being willing to 
hold each other's notes. 
8. The first Savings Bank and the foundation of the savings bank 
movement. 
9. The foundation of the investment trust movement. 
10. The first bank to see the advantage of forming a finance house 
subsidiary. 
11. The first mobile banks, including a boat bank for island 
services. 
12. The first bank to introduce computerised bank accounts. 
13. Innovating in the financing of North Sea oil developments. 
5.3 Consent for the takeover of the Royal Bank would give the green light 
for a takeover bid for the Bank of Scotland, and perhaps for Lloyds 
or the Midland Bank, (c.f. the Allianz bid for Eagle Star). While 
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t he S c o t t i s h banks add only two i ndependen t u n i t s t o the B r i t i s h 
banking system, t h i s add i t ion i s not n e g l i g i b l e where ove ra l l numbers 
are a l r e a d y so s m a l l . By t h e s t a n d a r d s of a l l o t h e r advanced 
c o u n t r i e s , the B r i t i s h banking system i s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y concentra ted 
5.4 The Uni ted S t a t e s has 11,663 banks of which a l l bu t 19 a re s m a l l e r 
than t h e Royal Bank. West Germany has over 250 commerc ia l banks , 
600 s a v i n g s banks , and some 4,000 c o - o p e r a t i v e banks , of which a l l 
but 16 are smal le r than the Royal Bank. Swi tzer land has 31 banks of 
which a l l but 3 are smal ler than the Royal Bank. Japan has 75 banks 
of which a l l but 24 are smal le r than the Royal Bank. The UK i s thus 
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y c o n c e n t r a t e d , t h e r e be ing only e i g h t i ndependen t 
domestic commercial banks. 
5.5 Although da t a on c o m p a r a t i v e bank pe r fo rmance a c r o s s t he comple te 
s i z e r ange i s hard to come by, US e a r n i n g s t a b l e s s u g g e s t t h a t 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s g r e a t e s t amongst banks w i t h about $100 m i l l i o n in 
a s s e t s , s m a l l compared t o t he Royal Bank ($11,500 m i l l i o n ) and Bank 
of America , ($100,000 m i l l i o n ) . In West Germany s t a t i s t i c s 
co l l e c t ed by the c e n t r a l bank show t h a t the th ree l a r g e s t commercial 
banks have been on average r a t h e r l e s s p r o f i t a b l e throughout the past 
decade than most of t h e i r c o m p e t i t o r s . I t may a l so be s i g n i f i c a n t 
t h a t t he s h a r e of t h o s e t h r e e l a r g e s t banks in t h e t o t a l a s s e t s of 
the banking i n d u s t r y has f a l l e n from about 24$ in 1950 to about 9% in 
1980. 
5.6 This concen t ra t ion has had the i n e v i t a b l e consequence of reducing to 
a handfu l t he number of i n d e p e n d e n t c e n t r e s of d e c i s i o n w i t h i n the 
banking system of the United Kingdom. In any i ndus t ry , t h i s kind of 
s i t u a t i o n i s p o t e n t i a l l y harmful t o innovat ion and development s ince 
i t may s e r i o u s l y l i m i t the d i v e r s i t y of t h o u g h t and d e c i s i o n . As 
P r o f e s s o r Gaskin has p o i n t e d o u t in h i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e s tudy of 
banking, " i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous in banking where the forces of 
c o n s e r v a t i s m a re p e c u l i a r l y s t r o n g " . In h i s book, Gaskin poses 
d i r e c t l y the q u e s t i o n " I s i t good for B r i t a i n as a whole t h a t the 
S c o t t i s h banks should s u r v i v e as s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s ? " and conc ludes 
t ha t t he r e i s "a c l ea r advantage from the na t i ona l point of view". 
5.7 I t has been suggested to us t h a t compet i t ion in B r i t i s h Banking might 
be improved by the amalgamation of Standard Chartered and the Royal 
Bank, thus providing a bank of s i m i l a r s i ze to the four major London 
Clearing banks. I t i s our view, however, and we be l i eve t h a t i t i s 
borne out by t he ev idence of economic h i s t o r y , t h a t the kind of 
compet i t ion which i s engendered by the c rea t ion of a s m a l l e r number 
of l a r g e r u n i t s i s not the kind of c o m p e t i t i o n which promotes the 
public i n t e r e s t . As we have s t a t e d above, o l i g o p o l i s t i c compet i t ion 
f o s t e r s c o n s e r v a t i s m , whereas t he p u b l i c i n t e r e s t which l i e s in 
i n n o v a t i o n i s b e s t served by m a i n t a i n i n g a g r e a t e r number of 
i ndependen t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g u n i t s . Combining two weak managements 
i n t o one l a r g e group i s a r e c i p e n e i t h e r for e f f e c t i v e c o m p e t i t i o n 
nor commercial success . 
5.8 Now t h a t the English Clearers have expanded compet i t ion in Scotland 
by ending t h e t a c i t ag reement w i t h the S c o t t i s h banks , on non-
i n t e r v e n t i o n t h e r e i s no r ea son why the Royal Bank, g iven proper 
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leadership, should not expand its activities in England, thereby 
increasing competition in the major part of the British banking 
system. Presumably, Standard Chartered, which is apparently anxious 
to establish a sound UK base for its operations, would also wish to 
do the same. Thus, consent to the takeover would mean a reduction 
in competition in English banking by eliminating two (Williams & 
Glyn's and Bank of Scotland) out of the eight British domestic banks. 
The Benefits to the United Kingdom of Edinburgh as a Financial Centre 
5.9 A takeover of the Royal Bank, with effective control moving from 
Edinburgh to London or to Hongkong, would do permanent and serious 
damage to Edinburgh as a centre of financial institutions. The 
following paragraphs outline the benefits to the United Kingdom (and 
to the EEC) which accrue from the present position of Edinburgh as a 
major financial centre, the only international financial centre 
outside London in the UK. 
5.10 There are located in Edinburgh at present the headquarters of two 
commercial banks, seven merchant banks, six insurance companies, 
more than thirty investment trusts, fifteen fund management 
companies, and several other related financial institutions. In 
addition, there are the head offices of four insurance companies in 
Glasgow and several investment trusts, two investment trusts in 
Dundee, one in Aberdeen and an insurance company headquartered in 
Perth. 
5.11 Measured by the funds under management as well as ownership, which 
are estimated to be in excess of £10,000 million, Edinburgh is the 
second most important financial centre in the EEC, and as such is a 
significant provider of invisible earnings for the UK as a whole. 
Edinburgh has a particular reputation in the field of investment 
expertise, and the investment trusts are a characteristic feature. 
Typically these trusts have small numbers of staff and they are, in 
ways which are often intangible, complementary to the banks. The 
staff strength, research potential, marketing impact and 
spokesmanship of independent banks can greatly help those fund 
management companies in the extension of their name and expertise 
throughout Europe. This is particularly important in winning 
business in the growing pension fund market. 
5.12 It is a fact that much of the international business which is won by 
Edinburgh financial institutions is business which would not 
otherwise have come to the UK. This point is analogous to the one 
which was made by British Caledonian Airways in their successful 
application to the Civil Aviation Authority for licences for North 
Atlantic flights in competition with British Airways. Their 
argument that if there were two British carriers more business in 
aggregate would be obtained for the UK as a whole, was accepted over 
the argument that a single national carrier "with real muscle" was 
the right answer. 
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5.13 With its wide range of financial expertise, Edinburgh is the second 
financial centre in Britain after London. It is very much in the 
British public interest that not all decision making in the financial 
sector should be centralised in London, but that Edinburgh should 
play a competitive and innovative role, as an alternative community 
with expertise and ideas which can contribute towards a vigorous 
financial sector and act as an important source of invisible 
earnings. The emergence of a money market in Edinburgh, though 
still limited in scale, is a significant development in this context. 
5.14 But the existence of a healthy financial centre in Edinburgh is 
critically dependent on the existence of indigenous commercial banks. 
It is difficult to think of any financial centre in Europe which does 
not also have headquarters of its own domestic banks. 
5.15 Very often the links between commercial banks and other financial 
institutions are intangible, and difficult to quantify, but they are 
nonetheless real. The existence of domestic banking head offices is 
an important ingredient if a proper money market is to be maintained, 
and in the creation of opportunities for merchant banks. It is 
significant that more merchant banks have been set up in Edinburgh 
than in any other British city except London; and it cannot be denied 
that the future development of merchant banking in Scotland would be 
prejudiced by the disappearance of commercial banking head offices. 
We have noted above the links between the head office activities of 
banks and fund management companies in winning business abroad. The 
disappearance of Scotland's two indigenous banks would leave the 
investment trusts and the other financial institutions isolated, with 
their prospects of development severely diminished. 
SECTION 6 - THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCOTLAND 
The Facts of Centralisation 
6.1 In the post-War period an increasing number of major Scottish 
companies have merged, been taken over or simply migrated, with the 
effect that their headquarters, and thus control, have moved out of 
Scotland, usually to London. In the 1950s, the most notable losses 
were amongst the composite insurance companies, including North 
British and Mercantile, Scottish Union, Caledonian, Century, Northern 
and others. Within the last decade, the location of effective 
control of the following major companies has moved out of Scotland: 
SUITS, United Biscuits, Burmah Oil, and Stenhouse. Four of these 
are among the six larger Scottish-registered companies measured by 
net tangible assets. The cumulative effect of these, and other such 
movements, is that the number of Scottish-based companies quoted on 
the Stock Exchange has declined dramatically over the last twenty 
years. 
6.2 The reasons for this accelerating drift, which has come to be known 
in Scotland as Centralisation, are not difficult to understand. For 
those Scottish companies which are serving a UK-wide market, it is 
often convenient to have factories situated close to their markets. 
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Consequently, the management of production and marketing operations 
is conducted in the South of England, and therefore it is natural to 
wish to have control exercised close to senior management. There is 
also the increasing importance of ready access to major Government 
Departments and to Trade Associations and other influence groups. 
In some cases, it may also be desirable to have recourse to English 
legal advice. The pressures of centralisation are facts of life 
which most Scottish companies have learned to live with - the 
constant gravitational pull towards the location of senior decision 
making in London and the South East of England. 
6.3 It may be asked: why should they resist these pressures? Why not 
succumb to the forces of gravity? Very often, from the point of view 
of the company, (ie the interest of the directors and the 
shareholders), there may be an advantage in making the move - and 
this is why such moves are made. However, from the standpoint of 
the public interest in Scotland, there can be no doubt that such 
moves are extremely damaging to the long-run development of the 
economy. 
6.4 The case for the damaging effects of centralisation has been 
frequently stated, and need not be repeated here. Indeed, the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission itself has cogently presented the 
case in Appendix 6 of its own Report on the takeover of SUITS by 
Lonrho. To quote from this Report: 
"The primary task of industrial policy in 
Scotland today is to create conditions which 
favour natural growth and strenthen indigenous 
enterprises growth not simply in 
production but in key management activity 
including the conception, design and marketing 
of products from a Scottish base and, 
importantly, financial control of the company's 
operations. In other words, conditions have 
to be as favourable for headquarters functions 
as for branch operations". 
Within the past decade the position has in fact worsened. The 
general pattern of post-War development in Scotland has resulted in 
the creation of branch plants and subsidiaries rather than the 
creation of new indigenously controlled firms. This growing element 
of external control made it inevitable that the ablest young men in 
management have tended to gravitate towards the point of control and 
away from Scotland. 
6.5 It is therefore growth and innovation which are the greatest 
casualties of centralisation. A Scottish company which has been 
taken over, or whose headquarters have moved South, frequently 
exhibits what may be called the "neutered cat" syndrome. Outwardly, 
there is no deterioration, not even any sign of change. The company 
- or at least its Scottish end - just ceases to grow, that is to 
adapt to changing circumstances. It may not innovate in terms of 
markets, technology or products for fear of treading on the interests 
of its (now removed) parent company. In the field of banking, the 
Clydesdale Bank provides an example. A wholly owned subsidiary of 
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the Midland Bank, it has maintained its presence in retail banking in 
Scotland - a continuing activity - but it has been unable to realise 
the other opportunities which have arisen in the industry in the 
1970s. It has no merchant bank, no finance house, no international 
arm, and its leasing operations are conducted by the Midland Bank. 
Its market share of retail banking in Scotland has not increased, and 
it is generally accepted that it has been less innovative, 
entrepreneurial and vigorous than the other two banks over the past 
few decades. It can only look forward to a future of stagnation 
since diversification opportunities are closed to it. 
The question of centralisation in Scotland is closely connected to 
the vital question of the climate of business confidence. A leading 
businessman, Mr Peter Balfour, now Deputy Chairman of the Royal Bank 
of Scotland Group Ltd, has put the matter in the following way: 
"I am personally appalled at the low morale in 
Scottish industry. We have heard speakers 
here this morning say, if you are successful, 
you will be taken over.... I find in my own 
business that I am continually trying to 
contradict the opinion-formers, the financial 
magazines and newspapers who say that my 
company must be taken over by some of its 
rivals in the south - in spite of the fact that 
those rivals in the south are smaller and less 
successful than we are. It seems to be part 
of our make-up at the moment, that we cannot 
think if we start in Scotland that we can 
thrive on our own account. It is this lack of 
confidence which is.... one of the real root 
causes of our problems in Scotland today." 
It is against this psychological background that one of the major 
consequences of a successful takeover of the Royal Bank may be 
understood. In terms of market capitalisation, the Royal Bank is 
the second largest company with its head office in Scotland. It is 
not putting it too strongly to say that if the Royal Bank goes, it 
will be the beginning of the end of the indigenous private sector in 
Scotland, with all which that implies for the regeneration of 
Scottish industry. The decline in confidence in this sector has 
proceeded pari passu with a decline in performance, which has 
accelerated in the past two decades. Equally, it must be said that 
this failure is not inevitable, and that it is open to government to 
create the policy environment in which it may be reversed. 
The principal harmful effect of centralisation is the loss of some of 
that very small number of people who have the capability of 
successfully realising new commercial opportunities. These are 
largely the same people who take responsibilities in public life. 
Consequently, their departure marks a simultaneous decline in the 
quality of public life. 
There is a critical minimum size for the Scottish business community, 
below which the gravitational pull of London becomes irresistible. 
49 
The departure of the Royal Bank would set in motion a chain of events 
which would bring that community very close to its minimum point. 
The immediate consequence would be the takeover of the Bank of 
Scotland, and thus the disappearance of all headquarters activity 
from Scotland as far as banking is concerned. We have already 
indicated the effect which this is likely to have on other financial 
institutions based in Scotland. Since major firms wish to have 
continuing access to top level financial advice, the movement of 
senior bankers out of Scotland would strengthen powerfully the 
centralising forces operating on the Scottish business community. 
The inducement to move their own headquarters south would be even 
stronger: the sense of isolation would become still more acute. 
6.10 Other more tangible effects of a takeover of the Royal Bank may be 
identified. So far as employment is concerned, the banking, 
insurance and finance industry has been one of the major post-War 
growth areas of the Scottish economy. This has undoubtedly been 
associated with the presence of much headquarters activity. So far 
as the Royal Bank itself is concerned, the takeover might be marked 
by only a small direct loss; more important is the less perceptible 
failure of future job opportunities to materialise. The indirect 
employment effects of head office activity - in printing, 
advertising, insurance broking, legal services, catering, retailing, 
etc etc would certainly be noticed. And of course reduction in 
the number of head offices will reduce the rateable value of the city 
or district concerned. 
6.11 In the short-run, a takeover of the Royal Bank by either of the two 
bidders, unlike the closure of a shipyard or a car assembly plant, 
would have little impact on the man in the street. Even in the 
long-run, it would scarcely be noticed by the customer for retail 
banking services. However, we believe, that for the reasons stated 
in this paper, such a takeover would have much more damaging effects 
for the future growth of the Scottish economy, and thus for the loss 
of employment in the long-run, than would the closure of a shipyard 
or a car assembly plant. 
6.12 Support for the arts and local charities would diminish. The 
directors of a London-based bank would understandably take a more 
personal interest in Covent Garden than in a commitment to the 
success of Scottish Opera or the Edinburgh Festival. The further 
depletion of the already shrinking community of senior decision-
makers would aggravate the existing social imbalance of the Scottish 
community. The complete organisation of a branch factory or branch 
office economy will inevitably result in a society of hewers of wood 
and drawers of water. This need not happen if Government is willing 
to assert the primacy of the public interest, and to lend its support 
to regional centres of gravity, that is centres of decision making 
which are strong enough to resist the gravitational pull of London. 
6.13 In the matter of the proposed takeover of the Royal Bank, there can 
be no doubt where the public interest in Scotland lies. It is 
agreed on all sides, and the history of the composite insurance 
companies illustrates the case, that there can be no such thing as 
effective safeguards. If the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
concludes that there is a substantial danger to the public interest 
in Scotland, its only realistic safeguard is to disallow the merger. 
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SECTIOI 7 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 In the course of preparing this paper, we have had discussions with a 
wide range of individuals and organisations, representative of all 
sections of economic life in Scotland. It is significant that we 
have not found anyone, other than those associated with the banks 
concerned, who regards the proposed takeovers as operating in the 
public interest in Scotland. Because of the small size of the 
business and financial community, many are reluctant to say so in 
public. 
7.2 We see no conflict between the public interest in Scotland and the 
public interest in the United Kingdom as a whole in this matter. On 
the contrary, we believe that a healthy British banking industry, 
which is to be vigorously competitive both at home and abroad, should 
have a larger, rather than a smaller, number of independent decision-
making units. 
7.3 It is no part of our argument that the two remaining Scottish banks 
should be protected from competition. On the contrary, we believe 
in the efficacy of competitive forces operating within a framework 
devised to serve the public interest. But we do not believe that 
the formation of large units by takeover and merger enhances 
competition. In this regard, we are heartened by the evidence of 
the tightening-up of the laws relating to competition in other 
industrialised countries. Most major industrialised countries have 
a much less concentrated banking system than does the United Kingdom, 
and all place restrictions on the possibility of their commercial 
banks being taken over. We invite the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission to consider what view they would take of a takeover bid 
for Lloyds Bank or Midland Bank. 
7.1 Since we have argued that either takeover of the Royal Bank would 
operate against the public interest, both in Scotland and the United 
Kingdom, we have not hitherto referred to the question of whether the 
Standard Chartered bid is to be preferred to that of the Hongkong and 
Shanghai bid, or vice versa. So far as the private interest of 
shareholders in the Royal Bank is concerned, the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank appears to be the more attractive. But from the point 
of view of the public interest, both bids are equally unacceptable. 
7.5 These bids, understandably, come at a time when there are substantial 
international opportunities for Scottish banking companies. Within 
the context of Europe in particular, the Scottish financial 
institutions are well-placed for a major expansion of their 
activities in the investment and merchant banking fields. Given the 
support of their own domestic banks, they could project themselves 
forcefully throughout Europe over the next ten years. 
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7.6 In banking, as in any other b u s i n e s s , the vigour of the d i r e c t o r s and 
sen io r management of a company, not i t s s i z e , i s the c r i t i c a l f ac to r 
in i t s s u c c e s s . Judged by t h e i r pe r fo rmance over the p a s t d e c a d e , 
cu lmina t ing in the f i a sco of the Standard Chartered bid , the presen t 
l e a d e r s h i p of t h e Royal Bank i s not equipped t o f a c e t he c h a l l e n g e s 
and o p p o r t u n i t i e s which l i e ahead . The r e f u s a l of t h e Monopol ies 
and Mergers Commission to approve the proposed takeovers would c r e a t e 
the oppor tun i ty for a new l e a d e r s h i p , wi th more f i n a n c i a l experience 
and g r e a t e r s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , to d i r e c t the Bank. 
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